Church Property Disputes in the Age of  Common-Core Protestantism : A Legislative Facts Rationale for Neutral Principles of Law by Bennett, Roger Wm.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 57 | Issue 1 Article 6
Winter 1982
Church Property Disputes in the Age of
"Common-Core Protestantism": A Legislative Facts
Rationale for Neutral Principles of Law
Roger Wm. Bennett
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Legislation Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bennett, Roger Wm. (1982) "Church Property Disputes in the Age of "Common-Core Protestantism": A Legislative Facts Rationale
for Neutral Principles of Law," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 57 : Iss. 1 , Article 6.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol57/iss1/6
Church Property Disputes in the Age of
"Common-Core Protestantism": A Legislative
Facts Rationale for Neutral Principles of Law
If there is any legal procedure which produces results strikingly un-
just from the perspective of one set of litigants, it is that procedure in
disputes over control of church property which requires judicial deference'
to the decision of the very denominational hierarchy whose conduct may
have caused the dispute.2 To illustrate the injustice, suppose that two
independent local churches, alike in every respect, choose to forsake their
complete independence by affiliating with denominational organizations
of generally compatible beliefs. Assume further that neither congrega-
tion is alert to church polity' distinctions, and by happenstance one af-
filiates with i Baptist4 group while the other affiliates with a Presbyterian5
group. Subsequently, both local churches are torn by internal dissension
over their denomination's actions and the majority in each local church
votes to disaffiliate from its denomination. When sued by the dissenting
See, e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). Although this is the .official
citation for Watson, the reporter of the case had great discretion in organizing the opinion.
See id. at 684 n.* (use of italics and convenient designation of Watson faction as "pro-slavery").
A version easier to follow is in the parallel citation, 30 L. Ed. 666.
' See, e.g., Exodus from United Methodist Church Accelerates, 25 CHRISTIANITY TODAY 1299
(1981).
" Church polity is the form or method of government of a church. Civil courts recognize
only two polities-congregational and hierarchical. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
679, 722-23 (1871). The former refers to churches which are "strictly independent of other
ecclesiastical associations, and so far as church government is concerned, [owe] no fealty
or obligation to any higher authority:' id. at 722, while the latter refers to systems within
which "there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals with a general and ultimate power of
control more or less complete... 2' Id. However, denominational councils within a con-
gregational polity may have strong advisory or admonitory powers, thereby rendering the
courts' test somewhat vague. See, e.g., S. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE 155-56 (Yale ed. 1972). See also note 190 & accompanying tex infra. If the distinction
is the presence of legally coercive power, it is conclusory.
Theology, in contrast, recognizes three basic polities, and many hybrids, by introducing
an intermediate polity variously designated presbyterian, connectional, or associational.
See generally F. MEAD, HANDBOOK OF DENOMINATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (6th ed. 1975);
1 J. MELTON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RELIGIONS (1978); 1 J. SCHAVER, THE POLITY OF THE
CHURCHES (1947). Not all denominations-i.e., aggregates of affiliated individual churches-
are hierarchical in the courts' terms. See Casad, Church Property Litigation: A Comment
on the Hull Church Case, 27 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 44, 45-46 (1970). See also F. MEAD, supra;
notes 147-59 & accompanying text infra.
Baptist polity is congregational. 1 J. SCHAVER, supra note 3, at 41.
Presbyterian polity, in the dichotomy of the courts, is hierarchical, e.g., Jones v. Wolf,
443 U.S. 595, 597-98 (1979), but theologically presbyterial, connectional, or associational.
See generally F. MEAD, supra note 3, at 217-30; 1 J. MELTON, supra note 3, at 109-43; 1 J.
SCHAVER, supra note 3, at 53-60.
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minorities for control of church property, the formerly Baptist church
majority prevails whereas the formerly Presbyterian church majority loses
its property to the minority. The reason for the disparate results is that
the formerly Presbyterian church majority, by an old, wooden, and ec-
centric judicial polity distinction,6 is deemed to have expected and im-
plicitly consented to the control of its property by the denomination.
Although the denomination invariably looks out for its own, the court
must defer to the denomination's decision.
In resolving such disputes, however, some courts have adopted another
procedure, neutral principles of law.' Under this method,' courts may
resolve church property disputes by simply determining the legal owner-
ship of the property, whether there are other beneficial interests or
restrictions on the property,' and whether the identity of the legal owner,
in the absence of beneficial interests or restrictions, is determined other
than by majority rule. 10 Under this method, both local church majorities
would likely prevail on typical facts.11 Both the deference" and the neutral
principles 3 methods have been held constitutionally permissible for judicial
resolution of church property disputes.1 4 That both methods are constitu-
tional, however, does not mean that one is no better than the other.
Both methods can be criticized as violating, in some measure, the policies
underlying the first amendment 5 and as excluding relevant evidence of
the parties' actual expectations prior to schism and the subsequent for-
mulation of allegations for litigation."6 For these reasons, a recent com-
See notes 82-87 & 147-59 & accompanying text infra.
This is the method of the Georgia courts after Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
See Jones v. Wolf, 244 Ga. 388, 260 S.E.2d 84 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1080 (1980).
, E.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979). Under the neutral principles approach of Jones,
courts may examine "certain religious documents, such as a church constitution," id. at 604,
in order to determine ownership of church property, provided that interpretation of such
religious documents would not "require the civil court to resolve a religious controversy."
Id. Commentators, however, have proposed narrower versions of the neutral principles
method, which would look only -to secular documents or to documents of title for owner-
ship, beneficial interests, or restrictions. See notes 17, 168 & 175 & accompanying text infra.
" See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979) (referring to "reversionary clauses and
trust provisions").
1o See id. at 607-10. Presumably, the identity of the holder of a beneficial interest would
be similarly analyzed should such an issue arise.
" See, e.g., id. at 607 ("If in fact Georgia has adopted a presumptive rule of majority
representation ... we think this would be consistent with both the neutral-principles analysis
and the First Amendment.").
11 E.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
" E.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
14 The constitutional provisions implicated are the first amendment's religion clauses:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof ... "' U.S. CONST. amend. I.
"1 See Sirico, The Constitutional Dimensions of Church Property Disputes, 59 WASH. U.L.Q.
1, 51-61 (1981).
16 Id. at 52, 67.
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mentator concluded that both methods are merely pragmatic ways for
courts to resolve disputes peacefully, and that the church members' ex-
pectations to which both allude are legal fictions. 17 This note, in contrast,
argues that the expectations of church members18 can be ascertained as
legislative facts,19 that these expectations are justifiable because they are
not belied by clear church teaching or doctrine, and that such expecta-
tions largely justify the presumptions and outcomes of the neutral prin-
ciples method.
The note surveys chronologically the four most relevant United States
Supreme Court decisions in church property disputes20 and shows that
church members' expectations regarding church government in general,
and church property control by logical extension, have so changed as to
discredit the assumptions of the seminal Supreme Court case, Watson
v. Jones.2' It then summarizes the constitutional doctrine underlying the
particular dispositions of the cases and uses the two doctrines-
nonentanglement and flexibility-to evaluate the deference and neutral
principles methods. The note rejects deference because it entangles courts
too frequently and too deeply in religious disputes, and because it is too
inflexible for some denominational polities. In contrast, the note supports
the neutral principles method in Jones v. Wolf' as nonentangling religious-
ly, and as very flexible toward the needs of churches. Finally, the note
suggests that denominations whose polity expectations are frustrated by
either the deference or the neutral principles method may take steps to
embody their expectations in a way which will enable-or even require'-
courts constitutionally to enforce them.
') Id at 63-68. Professor Sirico advocates a neutral principles variant which would look
only to "secular documents:' id. at 68, on an explicit rationale of judicial efficiency, id.
at 71. Much of the force of his argument is undermined if the unmodified neutral principles
method can be shown to accord with actual church members' expectations, rather than
proceeding on fictitious and unascertainable expectations.
" The church members considered in this note are Protestants.
"Legislative facts are ordinarily general and do not concern the immediate parties
.... [Wlhenever a tribunal engages in the creation of law or of policy, it may need to
resort to legislative facts, whether or not those facts have been developed on the record."
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT S 15.03, at 296 (3d ed. 1972). "[Tlhe formulation of law
and policy ... obviously gains strength to the extent that information replaces guesswork
or ignorance or hunch or intuition or general impressions." Id. S 15.03, at 297. "T]he opin-
ion which specifically identifies extra-record materials used in creating law or in determin-
ing policy may involve less reliance on extra-record information than the more conven-
tional opinion ... which in fact is heavily dependent upon the assumption of unproved
facts which are left vague and unidentified:' Id. See generally B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE
OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98-141 (1921); K. DAVIS, supra S 15.03; Alfange, The Relevance of
Legislative Facts in Constitutional Law, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 637 (1966); Karst, Legislative Facts
in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SuP. CT. REV. 75.
1 For a discussion of all United States Supreme Court opinions in church property
disputes, see Sirico, supra note 15, at 7-51.
"1 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
2 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
1 See id. at 606 ("[C]ivil courts will be bound to give effect to the result indicated by
the parties, provided it is embodied in some legally cognizable form.").
1982]
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EVOLUTION OF THE LAW AND REVOLUTION IN CHURCH LIFE
Deference and Its Rationales
Early churchproperty disputes in American courtsu often were decid-
ed by deference to the assumed intent of the donors of the property. Under
this rationale for judicial deference, it was assumed that the donors ex-
pected the recipient local church to remain faithful to both its denomina-
tional affiliation and doctrinal commitments at the time of the gift.' Thus,
an apparent gift created an "implied trust" in favor of those who remain-
ed so faithful. 8 In the event of a local church schism, the faction loyal
to the denomination would be awarded control of the property unless the
denomination had committed such a departure from doctrine as to violate
the doctrinal terms of the implied trusty The donor's intent regarding
doctrine was deemed to outweigh that regarding denomination;2 thus,
by a legal fiction29 the law subjected local churches and denominations
to a dead hand control which discouraged doctrinal change by the risk
of property forfeiture.2 Moreover, in the face of multiple donors during
a period which encompassed minor, unprotested doctrinal changes, the
implied trust rationale was unworkably complex in operation.'
For more extended discussion of methods used before the period treated in this note,
see Sampen, Civil Courts, Church Property, and Neutral Principles of Law: A Dissenting
View, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 543, 546-58; Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes over the Use of
Church Property, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1142, 1149-54 (1962).
Kauper, Church Autonomy and the First Amendment: The Presbyterian Church Case,
1969 SuP. CT. REV. 347, 349-50.
2 Id.
27 Id.
' See Comment, Constitutional Law: Neutral Principles of Law and Majority Rule Presump-
tion Applied in Disputes Over Church Property, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 590, 591 (1980).
2 Kauper, supra note 25, at 350; see First Baptist Church v. Fort, 93 Tex. 215, 54 S.W.
892 (1900). In First Baptist, "[a] church building was erected ... and paid for by subscrip-
tion from the members of the church and others." 93 Tex. at 224, 54 S.W. at 894. The
court assumed, "as a matter of common knowledge," ida at 225, 54 S.W. at 895, that such
subscriptions usually were "not confined to the membership of the particular church or
denomination, but, in fact, [included] members of all denominations, as well as those who
belong to no church .... " Id. The court criticized the implied trust rationale as based
on the fictional assumption that such varied donors invariably expect the recipient church
to remain faithful to its teachings at the time of the gift:
The contributing Jew-they are not few-is presumed to be especially anx-
ious that the Messiahship of Christ should be taught, though the failure to
believe it cast down his temple and broke down the walls of his holy city,
making his people wanderers upon the earth. . . . [The Methodist brother
who aided to build the house could interfere and say "No, you must teach
immersion as the only valid mode, because my gift was based upon your con-
tinuance in teaching that error." . . . The fallacy lies in presuming the ex-
istence of a purpose of which there is no proof.
Id. at 226, 54 S.W. at 895-96.
" Kauper, supra note 25, at 352.
"' See Sampen, supra note 24, at 550 (noting the difficulty of identifying particular donors,
and "the relevant doctrines on behalf of which the property was conveyed").
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In the landmark case of Watson v. Jones," the United States Supreme
Court abandoned the implied trust rationale3 in federal common laws'
and devised instead an implied consent rationale for deference.H The facts,
controversies, and holding in Watson were complex, but because they are
frequently misconstrued,8 they merit, close consideration.
As the Civil War opened, a schism opened as well in the Presbyterian
Church in the United States (PCUS)17 Soon after May 1865, it was found
that most members (the Jones faction) of the Walnut Street Presbyterian
Church (WSPC) in Louisville, Kentucky, concurred with the pro-Unionist
and antislavery resolutions and actions of the denomination's highest
authority, its General Assembly.' The majority (the Watson faction) of
both the WSPC Session (elders) and the WSPC trustees,3 9 however,
sympathized"0 with a declaration of the Louisville Presbytery (the church
authority immediately above the Session) which viewed the very passage
of the General Assembly's resolution as a "usurpation of authority,"'1 and
perhaps opposed the resolution's substance as well. 2 When the conflict
between the church members and the elders of the WSPC Session became
3 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
Id. at 727-29; Kauper, supra note 25, at 359.
Watson was originally a federal common law decision. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral,
344 U.S. 94, 115-16 (1952). Its holding, however, was subsequently elevated to constitu-
tional status, id. at 116, perhaps because of the intervening decision in Erie R.R. v. Tomp-
kins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), declaring that "[t]here is no federal general common law." Cf.
M. HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 84 (1965) (abolition of federal common law ac-
companied by expansion of scope of constitutional law). But see C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS S 60, at 279 (3d ed. 1976) ("It is clear.., that there is a 'federal
common law' even if not a 'federal general common law. ").
" 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 729 ("All who unite themselves to [a hierarchical church] do so
with an implied consent to [its] government, and are bound to submit to it.").
See notes 64-74 & accompanying text infra.
1 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 684, 690-91; Mulder, The Long, Rocky Road to Reunion, UNITED
PRESBYTERIAN AD., Nov. 1981, at 14-17 (describing the division of American Presbyterians
during the Civil War and current efforts toward reunification of northern and southern
denominations).
- 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 690-91, 693. The polity of the PCUS at the time of Watson con-
sisted, in order of increasing authority, of a "series of 'judicatories,' known as Church Ses-
sions, Presbyteries, Synods, and a General Assembly." Id. at 681.
The trustees, though "[c]onnected with each local church," id. at 681, served no ec-
clesiastical function. Id. Rather, they were persons "in whom [was] vested for form's sake,
the legal title to the church edifice and other property; the equitable power of manage-
ment of the property being with the Session:' Id. The Church Session controlled the daily
affairs of the local church, and included the pastor and "ruling elders" drawn from the
local church's congregation. Id.
40 See id. at 691, 693.
" Id. at 691.
42 See id. (noting the doctrine announced by some Southern churches that slavery was
"'a divine institution:" and that it was "'the peculiar mission of the Southern church
to conserve [it]' "). But see id. at 684 n.* ("pro-slavery" designation of Watson faction a
mere convenience); Mulder, supra note 37, at 14-15 (suggesting that Southern Presbyterians
believed that the church, as a purely spiritual body, should not involve itself in political
and social matters).
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serious, the Synod of Kentucky (the next higher authority above the
Presbytery) appointed a committee to conduct an election of additional
elders to the WSPC Session." Three additional elders belonging to the
Jones faction were elected over the opposition and protest of the existing
pro-Watson elders,44 thereby granting the Jones faction a controlling
majority within the Session.45 Continuing opposition by the pro-Watson
elders led the Jones faction to file a bill in the Louisville Chancery Court
to assert the right of the newly elected elders to participate "in the
management of the church property."4" The Court of Appeals of Kentucky
reversed the decree of the chancellor awarding property control to the
Jones faction4" and, after further litigation, ordered that control be
restored to the Watson faction.48
At least until this election and the commencement of the chancery suit,
both sides in the local WSPC dispute professed loyalty to, if not agree-
ment with, the same Presbytery, Synod, and General Assembly.49 Only
after the election of additional elders did both the Synod of Kentucky
and the Presbytery of Louisville divide formally over the General
Assembly's actions.5 ° As the chancery suit progressed, WSPC factions
aligned themselves with sympathetic Presbytery and Synod factions.51
However, until the General Assembly, on June 1, 1867, recognized the
Synod and Presbytery factions which concurred in their resolutions and
repudiated the dissident factions, both sides of the WSPC still professed
loyalty to the General Assembly.52 Only then did the Synod faction op-
posed to the General Assembly's actions equivocally resolve "'that in its
future action, [this Synod] will be governed by this recognized sundering
of all its relations to the ... revolutionary body (the General Assembly)
by the acts of that body itself.' " Because the Watson faction remained
loyal to the protesting Synod faction, it, too, implicitly recognized its
severance from the General Assembly.Y
's 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 684-85.
" Id. at 685.
A majority of the Session's members was sufficient to control the Session, which in
turn controlled the local church. Id. at 681. The election of the three additional elders
tranformed the Session's two-to-one majority in favor of the Watson faction into a four-
to-two majority in favor of the Jones faction. See id. at 685-86. See also id. at 687 (noting
that the Louisville Chancery Court's subsequent order of July 23, 1866, recognizing and
enforcing the validity of the election, effectively granted "exclusive control" of the church
property to the Jones faction (emphasis in original)).
" 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 685.
, Id. at 687.
" Id. at 689-90. The final order of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky came in 1868, id.,
after the Watson faction had seceded from the PCUS. See id. at 692-93.
" Id. at 692.
See id. at 685, 692.
1, Id. at 692.
5 Id.
Id. at 693.
u Id.
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In 1868, after the secession of the Watson faction from the PCUS, and
after the ruling by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in favor of the Wat-
son faction, the Jones faction sued in diversity in the then federal circuit
court." The suit claimed the faction was entitled to the property because
of the General Assembly's recognition of the Presbytery and Synod fac-
tions with which the Jones faction aligned itself." The action sought to
enjoin the Watson faction from attempting to disturb the Jones faction's
possession of the WSPC property." Although both the deed and the WSPC
charter subjected the property and its trustees to the operation of the
fundamental laws of the PCUS," and although both WSPC factions pro-
fessedly remained loyal to the General Assembly before its resolution
of the controversy, 59 the Supreme Court in affirming the circuit court deci-
sion for the Jones faction went beyond these sufficient facts to engage
in broad dicta.0
After distinguishing two other classes of church property disputes from
those arising in hierarchical churches like the PCUS, 1 the Court broadly
stated in a further dictum that those who unite with a hierarchical
denomination "do so with an implied consent to [its] government, and are
bound to submit to it."6 Thus, unlike the result under the implied trust
rationale for deference, a denomination could, with impunity, alter pro-
foundly its doctrinal standards. The implied trust bias toward doctrinal
stability was replaced in federal common law with a bias toward institu-
tional stability.'
Because Watson did not constitutionally limit judicial action,64 state
courts freely rejected it65 or limited it to churches with hierarchical
polities. Even courts which followed Watson were occasionally careless
in stating its holding, for example, by citing it as authority for forfeiture
of church property upon disaffiliation from a denomination, 7 rather than
See id. at 690, 694.
Id. at 695-96.
Id. at 696.
5' Id. at 683. The deed and charter did not expressly subject the property to such con-
trol, but both factions conceded that such was their intention. Id.
5' Id. at 692.
Id. at 722-35.
Id. at 722-26.
Id. at 729.
Sirico, supra note 15, at 15; see 1977 Wis. L. REV. 904, 917.
But see note 34 supra.
See M. HowE, supra note 34, at 85.
Kauper, supra note 25, at 362-63; see Casad, The Establishment Clause and the Ecumenical
Movement, 62 MICH. L. REV. 419, 443 (1964).
' See Gaff v. Greer, 88 Ind. 122,132 (1882) ("This judgment [of the presbytery] establishes
the fact that the majority had seceded from the church; having done so, they thereby forfeited
all right to any portion of the church property. This proposition is well settled.") (citing
Watson). The quoted language is dicta, however, as the court in Gaff did not actually rest
its decision on the mere fact of secession, but also on the presbytery's implicit award of
the property to the minority which remained loyal to the denomination. See 88 Ind. at
19821
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for deference to whatever disposition the relevant church authority might
make. Commentators also have misread Watson's facts, for example, by
placing the Watson faction's withdrawal from the PCUS immediately after
the PCUS' pro-Unionist, antislavery pronouncements in 1865,1 rather than
after the 1867 General Assembly,69 or by suggesting that the antislavery
substance of the PCUS declarations, rather than a dispute over the right
of the PCUS to voice an opinion at all, was the source of the WSPC
schism.70 Such misinterpretations have obscured the Watson decision's
following simply and logically from the relevant facts - adjudicative7 and
otherwise7 - and the decision's amounting to enforcement of the decree
of an arbitrator chosen by the parties.73 This confusion has created the
illusion that any departure from Watson's dicta must be a repudiation
of precedent, rather than an application of similar logic to now different
legislative and adjudicative facts."
During the ensuing century, the separate rationales of implied trust
and implied consent coexisted and coalesced in state court decisions, un-
til the distinction between them was so obscured that "implied trust"
came to signify, somewhat inaccurately,75 either rationale for deference. 71
131. The decision therefore follows Watson's deference approach, despite the court's inac-
curate restatement of Watson's holding.
E.g., Adams & Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf: Church Autonomy and the Religions Clauses
of the First Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1298 (1980).
' See text accompanying notes 52-54 supra.
" Compare Adams & Hanlon, supra note 68, at 1299 (attributing schism to the antislavery
substance of the General Assembly's declarations) with S. AHLSTROM, supra note 3, at 648
(Presbyterian Church of the Confederate States of America, which constituted the seceders
from the PCUS, see 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 692, declared in 1861: "'We have no right, as
a Church, to enjoin [slavery] as a duty, or to condemn it as a sin.' "), and 1 J. MELTON,
supra. note 3, at 135 ("Presbyterians in the South claimed the Assembly had no right to
make ... a political statement."), and Mulder, supra note 37, at 14-15 (similar view). But
see text accompanying note 42 supra.
71 Both factions in Watson conceded the church property to be subject to the laws of
the PCUS, and both factions acknowledged the General Assembly as the highest authority
within the PCUS up to the moment of the Assembly's resolution of the controversy. See
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 683, 692. Hence, the Court did not need to create a fiction of "implied
consent" applicable to all hierarchical polities, see id. at 729, since the adjudicative facts
established that consent to the authority of the Assembly to decide the dispute actually
existed.
Although the Court did not expressly utilize any legislative facts, the general religious
climate of the period also supports the conclusion that church members of a hierarchical
denomination as in Watson actually expected to be governed by the decisions of their
denomination's highest authority. See notes 77-79 & accompanying text infra.
' See notes 71-72 supra.
, See notes 80-95 & accompanying text infra. See also K. DAvis. supra note 19, § 15.03.
' The two rationales differ significantly in their theoretical bases. Implied consent is
founded upon the assumed consent of present church members to be governed by their
denomination's highest authority, while implied trust is based upon the assumption that
donors expect the recipient church to adhere to the religious practices followed at the
time of the gift. See notes 25-30 & 62-63 & accompanying text supra. Implied trust therefore
promotes doctrinal stability, while implied consent promotes institutional stability even
in the face of doctrinal changes. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
7 E.g., United Methodist Church v. St. Louis Crossing Indep. Methodist Church, 150
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Beyond this merely conceptual confusion, however, there developed two
significant and related phenomena- "common-core Protestantism" and the
neutral principles method.
The Emergence of "Common-Core Protestantism" as
an Appropriate Legislative Fact
Protestants' attitudes toward their churches changed markedly. In the
era of Watson, the nation was embroiled in a frenzy of denominationalism
and sectarianism.71 Church members were so generally aware of distinc-
tions in forms of church polity as well as other doctrinal matters that
the broad reference in Watson to "implied consent"78 was to a consent
which most likely existed in fact.79
In contrast, the recent era in American church life is characterized by
"common-core Protestantism."' Church members are largely unaware of
denominational distinctions. As one commentator has noted: "In practice
the church places less stress on denominational distinctiveness .... As
standards for church membership become inclusive, correct doctrine is
no longer the test for membership.... [L]ess emphasis is placed on indoc-
trination and inculcation of distinctive denominational teachings, tending
thereby to minimize and obscure theological differences."'" Moreover, the
denominational polity distinctions so crucial to the implied consent ra-
tionale for deference' do not survive the leveling effects of common-core
Protestantism. Rather, "'[t]he Presbyterian type has become more con-
gregational, and the Congregational type has become more presbyterian
and representative.... [T]hey have all thoroughly assimilated the princi-
ple of democracy and are allowing any jure divino theories to fall into
oblivion.' " Indeed, it has been estimated that "'[nlinety percent of the
procedures of any denomination today are untainted by denominational
Ind. App. 574, 579, 276 N.E.2d 916, 919 (1971) ("[A] hierarchical polity serves as the founda-
tion for the implied trust theory .... "
7 S. AHLSTROM, supra note 3, at 468-69; id. at 472-90 (sectarian revival); id. at 740 ("rising
denominational self consciousness" during half century preceding Civil War); R. LEE, THE
SOCIAL SOURCES OF CHURCH UNITY 77 ("hyper-denominational emphasis" among "American
Protestants in the nineteenth century"). See also H.R. NIEBUHR, THE SOCIAL SOURCES OF
DENOMINATIONALISM (1929).
7' 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 729.
See note 77 supra. The adherence to the General Assembly by both factions in Wat-
son, see notes 58-59 & accompanying text supra, further supports such an observation.
S. AHLSTROM, supra note 3, at 842-43, 845, 847, 962; R. LEE, supra note 77, at 83.
" R. LEE, supra note 77, at 86; accord, S. AHLSTROM, supra note 3, at 845, 962; R. STARK
& C. GLOCK, AMERICAN PIETY 22-56, 141-62 (1968).
See notes 147-48 & accompanying text infra.
R. LEE. supra note 77, at 93-94 (quoting A. BASS. PROTESTANTISM IN THE UNITED STATES
275 (1929)); cf. J. KENNEDY, PRESBYTERIAN AUTHORITY AND DISCIPLINE 68 (1965)
("Presbyterianism can degenerate into congregationalism, and congregationalism into laissez-
a//er .... ).
1982]
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association.' "' The truth of such assertions about doctrinal and polity
compromise is reflected in "free movement from denomination to
denomination, or the seemingly interchangeable membership of the
laity .... [D]enominational 'passing' is commonplace and done with relative
ease .... Denominational differences to the lay mind seem to be eroding."'
Even church architecture, hymnody, Sunday school literature, and sanc-
tuary furnishings are virtually interchangeable.8 6 Finally, nondenomina-
tional seminaries have become an important source of pastoral training, 7
still further eroding denominational distinctiveness.
This does not mean, however, that church members are unaware that
the church, like any other institution, must govern itself somehow, nor
that they are without tacit agreement regarding how, in fact, their own
churches are governed. American individualism so pervades church
members' thinking8 that one American religious scholar, describing the
American church to English readers, observed that there is some truth
to the judgment that
all churches in America, whatever their polity, are congregational....
... [W]hen the average American thinks of his church, he thinks
... of the four walls of the building where he worships on Sunday
and of the group of familiar friends and neighbours whom he meets
8 R. LEE, supra note 77, at 83 n.18 (quoting Horton, Now the United Church of Christ, CHRIS-
TIAN CENTURY, June 12, 1957, at 733).
' R. LEE, supra note 77, at 86-87; accord, S. AHLSTROM, sura note 3, at 847 ("Denomina-
tional interchangeability was a feature of common-core Protestantism, and the movement
of individuals within the system served to accentuate its overall homogeneity."). See also
J. KENNEDY. supra note 83, at 64-66 (similar situation in Scottish "kirk"). One study has shown
that 46% of Protestant church members have changed denomination, R. STARK & C. GLOCK.
supra note 81, at 184, and of these 24% have changed more than once, see id. at 184 n.4.
Lutheran, Episcopal, and Baptist denominations-the denominations which arguably differ
most from other Protestant denominations -tend more to retain their members. See id.
at 186 (Lutherans and Episcopals); Roof & Hadaway, Denominational Switching in the Seven-
ties: Going Beyond Stark and Glock, 18 J. SCIENTIFIC STUDY RELIGION 363, 367 (1979) (Bap-
tists). A common cause of denominational change is a change of residence. See Hadaway,
Denominational Switching and Membership Growth: In Search of a Relationship, 39 Soc.
ANALYSIS 321,322 (1978). Curiously, those who are more religious as measured by attendance
are most likely to change denomination, id. at 323, suggesting that mere exposure to church
teaching does not produce greater denominational fidelity. See also notes 80-84 & accompa-
nying text supra.
" See S. AHLSTROM. supra note 3, at 842-43; R. LEE, supra note 77, at 83. Moreover, much
of the work formerly done by particular churches, such as missionary work and care for
the aged, is now undertaken by secondary religious organizations which may serve more
than one primary religious body or church. See 1 J. MELTON, supra note 3, at viii.
"See R. LEE, supra note 77, at 92. In 1970-1971, for example, 20% of non-Catholic
seminarians were enrolled in nondenominational or interdenominational seminaries. See
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF THEOLOGICAL SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA. FACT
BooK ON THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION 1970-71, at 40 (1971) [hereinafter cited as THEOLOGICAL
SCHOOLS]. If Episcopal (including Canadian Anglican), Lutheran, and Baptist seminarians are
excluded, see note 85 supra, the figure exceeds 36%. See THEOLOGICAL SCHOOLS, supra, at 40.
's See W. SPERRY. RELIGION IN AMERICA 9 (1946); cf. J. KENNEDY, supra note 83, at 65-66
(noting similar individualistic trends in Scotland).
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there.... Even his denomination, which must constantly be preached
to him as a larger truth, means less to him than the particular
parish....
He went on to remark:
The Church of England in its totality is felt as present in each [English]
parish church; [n]onconformity in its entirety [is] in each [English]
chapel. At this point our [American] religious life is far more parochial
and provincial. There is no clause in the Apostles' Creed more dif-
ficult for the typical American to understand than . . 'the commu-
nion of saints' . . . .9
Thus, for good or ill-an inquiry forbidden the civil courts91 - to the
average American church member the "church" which governs itself is
the local body, and its polity is democratic. Furthermore, there appears
to be no reason to believe that a faction which claims the benefits of a
hierarchical polity in a church property dispute believed any differently
than the average member before the dispute arose.
The practical day-to-day autonomy of local churches, even within
allegedly hierarchical denominations, most likely reinforces church
members' expectations of congregationalism.2 Moreover, church
documents may be too ambiguous to give such constructive notice of
hierarchical polity as would make church members' congregationalist
assumptions unreasonable. 3 Although judicial inquiry into religious
W. SPERRY, supra note 88, at 9-10.
Id. at 131-32.
" Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1871) ("The law knows no heresy, and
is committed to the support of no dogma:').
92 See 1 J. SCHAVER, supra note 3, at 191-94 (describing nearly complete breakdown of Pro-
testant church discipline); cf. J. KENNEDY. supra note 83, at vii, 65-67 (noting breakdown of
discipline within Scottish Presbyterian "kirk").
0 For example, the Westminster Confession of Faith "is the confession [i.e., codification
of religious doctrine] that has had the greatest impact on U.S. churches in the Reformed-
Presbyterian tradition." 1 J. MELTON. supra note 3, at 111. As such, it is a central religious
document in many Presbyterian denominations in the United States, see id. at 127, 129,
131-33, including the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America (UPC).
See PART I OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA (THE BOOK OF CONFESSIONS) SS 6.001-.178 (1970 ed.) [hereinafter cited as I CONST.].
In several places it would appear to limit church discipline to spiritual sanctions. See
Westminster Confession of Faith ch. XXIH, 3-4; ch. XXX, 1-4; ch. XXXI, 4 (1647), reprinted
in I CONST., supra, SS 6.121-.122, 6.154-.157, 6.161.
Within the UPC, the more secular portion of its constitution similarly limits church author-
ity. See PART II OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA (THE BOOK OF ORDER) S 31.08 (1980 ed.) [hereinafter cited as II CONST.]
("Since ecclesiastical discipline must be purely moral or spiritual in its object, and not at-
tended with any civil effects, it can derive no force whatever but from its own justice....M;
id. S 35.03 ("[Jludicatories ought not ... to impose any civil penalties. Their power is wholly
moral or spiritual. ... ). The UPC's Book of Church Discipline, II CONST.. supra, 55
81.00-94.06, also states that "[r]emoval from office or membership is the highest degree
of censure:' Id. S 90.05. Finally, the UPC constitution leaves property and general residual
powers to the local church session (elders). See id. §5 41.08, 62.04, 62.08.
Although these and other provisions might be somewhat ambiguous, they seem to justify
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precepts in church documents involved in a particular case would be
improper,94 prevailing attitudes which both reflect and may be viewed
together with the practical day-to-day autonomy of local churches and
the congregationalist assumptions of church members are legislative facts95
which form a basis for rejecting the implied consent rationale for
deference: the rationale has become a perversely inaccurate fiction.
Constitutional Evisceration of Deference Rationales and the
Emergence of the "Neutral Principles" Method
Whatever factual basis may have remained for deference after the
emergence of "common-core Protestantism" was weakened by Supreme
Court decisions in 1969 and 1976. The implied trust rationale survived
a belief that constituent congregations have the power, if not the right, to withdraw, by
vote of their sessions, without property forfeiture to the denomination or a loyal minority.
Cf. Master v. Second Parish, 124 F.2d 622, 627 (1st Cir. 1941) ("The agreement is not to
be read through the eyeglasses of experts versed in the subtleties of Presbyterian church
law. Rather, it should be interpreted from the viewpoint of the local folks worshipping
in neighboring churches in Portland who sought to get together .... "); Casad, supra note
3, at 64 (suggesting that church property control be placed where an ordinary lay member
would be justified in believing it to be). See generally 3 J. POMEROY. EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
S 803, at 187 (5th ed. 1941) ("[W]hen one of two innocent persons ... must suffer a loss,
it must be borne by that one of them who by his conduct-acts or omissions-has rendered
the injury possible." (footnote omitted)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1979)
("In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof,
that meaning is generally preferred which operates against the party who supplies the
words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds.").
The General Assembly of the UPC, in response to Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979),
proposed in 1980 to amend its constitution. 24 CHRISTIANITY TODAY 782-83 (1980). See also
443 U.S. at 613 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[C]hurches may deem it necessary, in light
of today's decision, to revise their constitutional documents ...."). The requisite presbyteries
ratified the amendment in the ensuing year, and the amendment became effective in 1981.
MINUTES OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA (pt. 1) 21 (1981) (Overture A) [hereinafter cited as MINUTES (pt. 1)]; UNITED
PRESBYTERIAN A.D., June-July 1981, at 44. The amendment creates a new Chapter XLII within
II CONST., supra, which expressly subjects property to a trust "for the use and benefit of the
United Presbyterian Church." Overture A, 1980, S 2, MINUTES (pt. 1), supra, at 24 (to be
codified at II CONST., supra, 5 72.02). The "formal title" or "secular documents" approaches
may be criticized as unable to consider an amendment such as S 72.02. See note 17 & ac-
companying text supra; notes 168 & 175 & accompanying text infra.
I E.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 605 (1979) (examination of church documents may
well involve "'a searching and therefore impermissible inquiry into church polity' ") (quoting
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 723 (1976)).
" The distinction drawn by the'text is that between adjudicative facts and legislative
facts. The former "relate to the parties, their activities, their properties, their businesses,"
K. DAVIS, supra note 19, § 15.03, at 296, while the latter are "general and do not concern the
immediate parties," id. Most significantly, adjudicative facts are "those to which the law
is applied," id, while legislative facts, in contrast, help to determine "the content of law,"
id. While the settlement of a church property dispute on the basis of that church's par-
ticular doctrine or practice would be constitutionally impermissible, Jones v. Wolf, 443
U.S. at 602, 605, the use of religious precepts reflecting the prevalence of common-core
Protestantism to invalidate the implied consent rationale for judicial deference would not
fall within such a prohibition. Such use of wholly general religious precepts would amount
Oil
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Watson v. Jones" and continued to live among the state courts7 until
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church.98 In Hull Church, the Supreme Court held that judicial review
for departure from doctrine, as required under the implied trust theory,
was constitutionally impermissible: "[TIhe [first] Amendment . . .com-
mands civil courts to decide church property disputes without resolving
underlying controversies over religious doctrine. Hence .... religious
organizations ... must structure relationships involving church property
so as not to require the civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions."9
The invalidation fatally wounded the implied trust rationale for deference
by forbidding courts which utilized it from enforcing their assumption
that the settlors of any fictitious trust expected the recipient church to
remain "essentially the same church."'' 0 The Georgia Supreme Court on
remand' mercifully let the rationale die and, apparently, no court has
yet permitted its resuscitation.'
The implied consent rationale for deference was weakened, perhaps
as grievously, in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich.11 There,
the Supreme Court struck down, as inconsistent with "the essence of
religious faith,"'' judicial review for "arbitrariness" in ecclesiastical deci-
sionmaking."'0 Although the Court did not expressly invalidate judicial
to the use of legislative facts, see generally sources cited at note 19 supra, used not to
adjudicate the claims of the parties, but to shape the content of law-for example, by
establishing a presumption to reflect prevailing religious attitudes as the neutral principles
method would do. See note 171 & accompanying text infra.
The same legislative facts suggest that following the emergence of common-core Pro-
testantism, donors would not intend that property be held in trust for the denomination.
However, it would not be totally unreasonable-if a state's implied trust doctrine survived
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S.
440 (1969)-to hold that older properties are impressed with implied trusts. But see notes
96-102 & accompanying text infra.
" See notes 34 & 64-65 & accompanying text supra.
" See Kauper, supra note 25, at 362-63; Note, supra note 24, at 1157-58.
95 373 U.S. 440 (1969). The Georgia courts had awarded control of church property to
two local congregations because of their denomination's departure from doctrine. Id. at 441-45.
"Id. at 449. See also Note, Religious Societies-Applicability of Hierarchical Church Law
to Property Disputes Resolved by Civil Courts, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1102, 1110 (1955).
o See Casad, supra note 3, at 53.
101 Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church, 225 Ga. 259, 167 S.E.2d
658 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1041 (1970).
"o This author's research revealed no case after Hull Church in which a court has clearly
continued an implied trust rationale formally conditioned on nondeparture from doctrine.
Tennessee, however, appears to favor implied trusts as a rule of construction for any prop-
erty transfers to voluntary associations with specific purposes. Thus, where property was
transferred to a corporation whose chirter disclosed that the purpose of the corporation
was to be affiliated with a denomination, an implied trust arose in favor of the denomina-
tion. See Fairmont Presbyterian Church, Inc. v. Presbytery of Holston, 531 S.W.2d 301
(Tenn. Ct. App., cert. denied by Tennessee Supreme Court 1975).
10 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
10 Id. at 714.
... Id. at 712-13.
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review for ecclesiastical fraud or collusion,"'8 it may have done so by
implication. ' The fiction of implied consent was thus broadened to en-
compass the notion that church members consent even to unfair treat-
ment from the denominations with which they affiliate - a startling
conclusion '1 8 forced by the Court's procrustean effort to save implied con-
sent from its free exercise clause infirmity.
With the death of the implied trust rationale for deference and the
weakening of the implied consent rationale, there arose a need for either
another deference rationale0 9 or another method altogether. Fortunately,
the Supreme Court in neither Hull Church nor Milivojevich insisted that
deference be continued. Instead, in Hull Church the Court left open the
10 Id. at 713 & n.7.
10, See 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 992, 1001 (1977); 45 Mo. L. REV. 518, 521-22 (1980).
108 Formerly, it was recognized that even if church members of a hierarchical church
consent to be governed by their denomination, they expect at least procedural fairness
from their denomination. See Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929)
("In the absence of fraud, collusion or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper Church
tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in
litigation before the secular courts .... "); Note, Judicial Intervention in Church Property
Disputes-Some Constitutional Considerations, 74 YALE L.J. 1113, 1118 (1965).
'1 At least two other rationales would appear possible. Professor Howe suggested that
courts promote pluralism by deference. See M. HOWE, supra note 34; Howe, The Supreme
Court, 1952 Term-Foreward: Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L. REV.
91 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Howe, Foreward]; cf. CHURCH, STATE, AND PUBLIC POLICY (J.
Mechling ed. 1978) (churches as "mediating structures"). A few reservations concerning
such a thesis may be voiced, however. First, as Howe concedes, "[pluralism of churches
is only to be commended when the state permits each church to choose from a multiplicity
of means for self-government that which is best suited to its needs." M. HOWE, supra note
34, at 34. The only form of deference now remaining, namely implied consent, would seem
to restrict as well as obscure the choices available to churches. See notes 160-65 & accom-
panying text infra. Second, the promotion of pluralism under the guise of religious liberty
may, ironically, create an "establishment [of] the egalitarian type," M. HOWE, supra note
34, at 100, which raises "the [constitutional] danger that an outlawed establishment may
reappear in the disguise of a preferred liberty," id. at 110. Third, and related to the second
objection, imputing such pluralistic intent to the constitution's framers seems implausible,
Howe, Foreward, supra, at 91, and as a justification for deference seems to increase threats
which the framers likely feared, such as the undermining of government's authority, id.,
because church denominations' social pronouncements in recent years have tended to be
critical of government. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 442 n.1. To the extent that denominational dissenters
have tended to favor the government, see id., deference would also seem to promote op-
pression of individuals, a result also feared by the framers. See Howe, Foreward, supra,
at 91-92. For these reasons, the legitimacy of pluralism as a rationale for deference seems
questionable.
Professor Casad, in contrast, has suggested that deference may be justified as an equitable
claim by a denomination to a stable list of affiliates, arising from people's reliance on
denominations' names when choosing their churches. See Casad, supra note 66, at 448-49.
See also Comment, The Role of Courts in Church Property Disputes, 38 Mo. L. REV. 625,644
(1973); 44 TUL. L. REV. 370, 375-76 (1970). However, denominational allegiance is comparatively
unimportant when most people choose their church, R. LEE. supra note 77, at 88, and a
denomination of congregational polity, see note 3 supra, theoretically would disclaim such
an entitlement. Thus, affiliation may give no rise to any entitlement to stable affiliations
on a theory that a church member otherwise could be seduced and abandoned.
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possibility of using "neutral principles of law,""11 applicable to all prop-
erty disputes, which could be followed without establishment clause
infirmity."'
The Georgia Supreme Court on remand of Hull Church"' developed
a method which it thought legally neutral. It searched deeds, the local
church charter, the state's statutes, and the denomination's constitution
for any language of trust, reversion, or other legal restriction on the church
property."' Finding no such restrictions in favor of the denomination, it
again awarded control to the local congregations.' Although Milivojevich
later cast a fleeting shadow over the validity of such a method,"5 the
United States Supreme Court in Jones v. Wolf"6 upheld the Georgia neutral
principles method, except for one ambiguity."
7
In Jones v. Wolf the members of a local congregation had voted 164
to 94 to withdraw from its denomination, the Presbyterian Church in the
United States (PCUS)."8 The Augusta-Macon Presbytery (the next higher
authority over the local church Session) appointed a commission to in-
vestigate and resolve the local dispute."' The majority of the congrega-
tion that had voted to withdraw took no part in the commission's inquiry
and did not appeal the commission's findings to a higher PCUS tribunal."
The majority had already repudiated the PCUS, and the decision of any
PCUS judicatory was therefore a foregone conclusion. The local majority
could only compromise its legal position by participation. Predictably, the
commission concluded that the local minority who remained loyal to the
denomination were the "true congregation.'
Thereafter, the minority's representatives sued in state court for
declaratory and injunctive relief to establish their right, as a PCUS af-
filiate, to exclusive use of the local property." The trial court, utilizing
Georgia's post-Hull Church neutral principles method, found that the deed
was to the local church without mention of any other beneficial interests.2'
"' 393 U.S. at 449.
" Id.
1 Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church, 225 Ga. 259,167 S.E.2d
658 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1041 (1970).
1 Id. at 260-61, 167 S.E.2d at 659-60.
" Id. at 261, 167 S.E.2d at 660.
1 See 45 FoRDHAM L. REV. 992, 1001 (1977).
116 443 U.S.. 595 (1979).
I The Court vacated and remanded for clarification of the reason why the Georgia courts
had awarded property to the local majority, rather than the minority. Id. at 606-10.
"I Id. at 598. This was not the same PCUS as in Watson. See F. MEAD, supra note 3,
at 207.
"' 443 U.S. at 598.
1" Id.
121 Id.
"' Id. at 598-99.
' Id. at 599, 601.
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Moreover, neither the state statutes regarding implied trusts nor the local
church charter created any beneficial interest in the PCUS.u Finally, the
PCUS constitution contained no language of trust or other restriction in
favor of the denomination.1" The trial court therefore granted judgment
for the local church's majority, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.'
By a narrow majority,"' the United States Supreme Court held that
the neutral principles method was consistent with coistitutional
principles." In an opinion written by Justice Blackmun, the Court com-
mented favorably on the method's flexibility'" in accommodating all forms
of polity: "Through appropriate reversionary clauses and trust provisions,
religious societies can specify what is to happen to church property in
the event of a particular contingency, or ... in the event of a schism
or doctrinal controversy."'30 The Court cautioned, however, .that examina-
tion of religious documents for any language of trust or other limitation
must be purely secular and not rely on any religious precepts."' The ap-
proved neutral principles method thus introduced the fiction that !church
property expectations are fully embodied in legal language, '32 which may
be false in the rare case involving litigants who are fully aware either
of their denomination's official doctrine and its logical consequence for
property control, or of legal precedents under the deference approach.
The Court vacated and remanded the case to the Georgia Supreme Court
for clarification regarding what neutral, principle under Georgia law
justified its award of control to the local majority,"= adding that a rebut-
table presumption that the local majority is to control the property would
be valid.1
Justice Powell, dissenting, maintained that only Watson's deference
method should be permitted in church property disputes." Characteriz-
ing the neutral principles method as a "new and complex, two-stage
114 Id. at 601.
125 Id.
' Id. at 599; Jones v. Wolf, 241 Ga. 208, 243 S.E.2d 860 (1978).
12 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979) (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, Rehn-
quist, and Stevens, JJ.); id. at 610-21 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and
Stewart and White, JJ.).
12 Id. at 602-04 (majority opinion).
... Id. at 603-04.
" Id. at 603. See also Comment, Enforcing Conditions Placed on Gifts to Religious
Institutions-Judicial Interference with the Free Exercise of Religion, 49 B.U.L. REV. 742,
753-54 (1969).
',' 443 U.S. at 604.
' See Sirico, supra note 15, at 58. But see 443 U.S. at 603-04 (noting the ease with which
expectations regarding property may be expressed through the neutral principles approach,
and suggesting that problems associated with it will diminish over time).
443 U.S. at 606-10.
'u Id. at 607-08. On remand the Georgia Supreme Court establish such a presumption.
Jones v. Wolf, 244 Ga. 388, 260 S.E.2d 84 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1080 (1980).
11 443 U.S. at 617 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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analysis,""' he insisted that it would increase judicial involvement in
church controversies and depart from long-established precedent.1" Under-
lying his particular concerns were an assumption that church members
know and consent to the implications of a denomination's constitution,"
and a construction of the PCUS constitution strongly in favor of its
drafter"-contrary to normal contract law.10 In short, Justice Powell
begged the question of whether general provisions of a denomination's
constitution, viewed in the light of the denomination's hierarchical gestalt,
yield a more accurate picture of prior property-control expectations than
do particular property-control provisions or their absence."'
APPLYING THE UNDERLYING CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
There remain, then, two constitutionally permissible methods for resolv-
ing church property disputes- deference, based on implied consent or
some other rationale not yet fully developed, 14 and neutral principles of
law. The validity of each method must be weighed by two underlying
principles derived from the first amendment's religion clauses. First, courts
must avoid entanglement in religious issues.14 Second, courts must allow
churches to govern themselves as they see fit.1 44 Although both methods
meet the constitutional minimums of these principles, it is appropriate
to prefer one method if it better serves the principles.1 45 The two current
methods must therefore be evaluated by the principles of judicial nonen-
tanglement in religious matters and flexibility toward the needs of
churches for self-government. 46
Deference requires judicial knowledge of to whom to defer.47 This, in
Watson-type deference, in turn requires a judicial inquiry into the ap-
plicable denominational polity.1 48 Such an inquiry entangles courts in
'' Id. at 610.
" Id. at 611.
1 See id. at 614, 617-19.
See id. at 615, 619-21.
,, See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS S 206 (1979).
4 See Sirico, supra note 15, at 48.
4 See note 109 & accompanying text supra.
14 E.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602.
14 See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952) ("New York's [statute]
directly prohibits the free exercise of an ecclesiastical right, the Church's choice of its
hierarchy:'); Northside Bible Church v. Goodson, 387 F.2d 534, 537-38 (5th Cir. 1967); 45
Mo. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980); 10 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 642, 647 (1974); cf. Jones v. Wolf, 443
U.S. at 603 (praising neutral principles approach as able "to accommodate all forms of religious
organization and polity").
1 See generally Sirico, supra note 15, at 68; 45 Mo. L. REV. 518, 527 (1980).
16 Based on such an analysis, it is possible to conclude, contrary to legal precedent, that
deference is unconstitutional. Adams & Hanlon, supra note 68, at 1297, 1337-38.
147 See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 614, 618-19 (Powell, J., dissenting).
148 See, e.g., id at 619-21; Casad, supra note 66, at 440; Kauper, supra note 25, at 370-71.
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delicate religious questions, both because the courts' criterion of polity
requires recourse to religious documents"' and because the roots of polity
go deeply into doctrinal matters,"' such as the authority given the church
by Christ.'51 Although the modern trend in church practice is toward a
pragmatic polity,'5' theologians still find it necessary to justify either a
particular polity or the principle of pragmatism from other doctrines.',
Moreover, courts have chosen a criterion of polity- authority "more or
less complete"" -more vague than the criteria of theology." In brief,
there is a sharp distinction between the representative or democratic
polities -congregationalism and connectionalism-and the authoritarian
polity of such clearly hierarchical churches as the Episcopal and Roman
Catholic-that is, the episcopal polity.'56 Churches with connectional
polities present the most difficult cases for courts because litigants can-
and too often do-argue plausibly that the church is either basically
congregational"' or basically hierarchical,' 5 at least as regards property
Deference also may require inquiry into polity under a flexible implied trust rationale.
In the words of one commentator, "[Is it not arguable that one purpose of a trust to a
congregationally organized church is that the congregation may decide the use of its pro-
perty?" Duesenberg, Jurisdiction of Civil Courts Over Religious Issues, 20 OHo ST. L.J. 508,
539-40 (1959).
"' See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 619-21 (Powell, J., dissenting).
E.g., R. PAUL, THE CHURCH IN SEARCH OF ITS SELF 30-33 (1972); Sirico, supra note 15,
at 53; Stringfellow, Law, Polity, and the Reunion of the Church: The Emerging Conflict Be-
tween Law and Theology in America, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 412, 419, 423-24 (1959). But cf. H.R.
NIEBUHR, supra note 77, at vii, 14-15 (history, sociology, and political experience may be more
relevant, albeit covertly, than doctrine in explaining denominational choice).
"' See J. KENNEDY, supra note 83, at 24.
1 See R. PAUL, supra note 150, at 34-35 ("[Tjhere are [Christians] who adhere to their view
of church government not because they believe God laid down any specific rules on the
matter, but because the polity of their church represents what in their view is the most
practical way of administering the Church.").
"' See id. at 35 (church leaders continue to "assert that the Church ... traces its ex-
istence and its form to the will of God").
" Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 722. Denominations with superior bodies possess-
ing authority "more or less complete" are deemed hierarchical by courts, while those not
recognizing such an authority are viewed as congregational. See note 3 supra.
" Theology sharply distinguishes basically democratic polities, including congregational
and connectional polities, see note 3 supra, from autocratic polities, such as those of the
Episcopal and Roman Catholic churches. See 1 J. SCHAVER, supra note 3. The democracy
of connectional polities is illustrated by the choosing of Presbyterian elders from among
the laity, so that church government is shared by clergy and laity. 1 J. MELTON, supra
note 3, at 112.
'w See 1 J. SCHAVER, supra note 3, at 22-23, 43-47, 56-60. This note follows Schaver's use
of the word "episcopal" to describe the Roman Catholic polity, id. at 21, even though that
polity "is not merely episcopal:' id. at 33. The distinction is that "[in an episcopal form
of government the highest authority is vested in a group of bishops," id., but in the Roman
Catholic Church "the bishops are subordinate to a still higher order, the papal order,"
id. at 34.
"7 See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 726; Sirico, supra note 15, at 12 n.52.
' See note 93 supra.
"' See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 620-21 (Powell, J., dissenting) (presenting view of loyal
minority that hierarchical structure of PCUS compelled deference to denomination's decision).
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control. Thus, the theologically eccentric polity dichotomy of the deference
theory creates qualitative entanglement by trying to resolve the religious
issue inherent in polity, and tuantitative entanglement by encouraging
repeated good faith litigation.
The polity dichotomy of deference is obviously inflexible as well.16 0 Not
only do connectional churches not fall clearly at one of the two poles -
except in legal precedent'-but there are yet other polities falling into
the theological interstices left open by purely congregational, connectional,
and episcopal categories. Here even theology lacks a label and resorts
to hybrid descriptions of the polities of some small denominations."2 Thus,
even if courts using the deference method somehow applied a third "con-
nectional" category to ameliorate their present dichotomous approach to
church property disputes,"' the polities of many churches still would not
be accommodated adequately. As matters now stand, deference arguably
inhibits the free exercise of religion'" by warning those church members
who are knowledgeable about the law of church property disputes that
their churches associate with a larger body at their own risk; deference-
method courts will not bother looking for a connectional or hybrid polity,
but will instead force any ensuing property dispute into one of their two
eccentric polity categories. 65
The neutral principles method by definition avoids direct entanglement-
in religious issues. Because deciding church property disputes on the basis
of religious issues violates the religion clauses of the first amendment,'"
the method properly puts the onus on churches to provide for the resolu-
tion of such disputes by expressing their property relationships in judicial-
ly cognizable legal language. 7 Moreover, such legal language should suf-
"0 See Adams & Hanlon, supra note 68, at 1337.
1I1 See Parker v. Harper, 295 Ky. 686, 688, 175 S.W.2d 361, 362 (1943) (citing legal precedents
regarding a particular denomination's polity).
I" See Adams & Hanlon, supra note 68, at 1292 n.6; Sirico, supra note 15, at 12-13. See
generally F. MEAD, supra note 3; 1 J. MELTON, supra note 3.
'" The Solomonic solutions of shared use or partition by sale appear to be rare, although
such solutions would represent an alternative to either deference to the denomination's
highest authority or recognition of majority rule within the local church.
16 See Adams & Hanlon, supra note 68, at 1297, 1337; 1977 UTAH L. REV. 138,146. See
also Bernard, Churches, Members and the Role of the Courts: Toward a Contractual Analysis,
51 NOTRE DAME LAw. 545, 562-67 (1976); Sirico, supra note 15, at 5.
16 Under the implied consent rationale, courts have even deferred to hierarchical deci-
sions in the face of express reservations of property control by the local church, e.g., Se-
cond Protestant Reformed Church v. Blankespoor, 350 Mich. 347, 86 N.W.2d 301 (1957),
presumably under the precedent of "Julia, who, according to Byron's reports, 'whispering
"I will ne'er consent;'-consented,'" Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 19 (1947) (Jackson,
J., dissenting).
I E.g., Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 447, 449 (1969).
16 Id. at 449. The full text of this dictum states: "Hence, States, religious organizations,
and individuals must structure relationships involving church property so as not to re-
quire the civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions." Id. (emphasis added). In context,
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fice to give constructive notice of a hierarchical polity to church
members,1" who may not be "canon lawyers"'' 9 capable of interpreting
religious precepts whose religious significance, let alone legal significance,
has never been demonstrated to them by precept or practice.1 7 1 If the
churches take no action to clarify property matters, then the neutral prin-
ciples method steps in with justifiable presumptions in favor of the legal
owner1 7 1 and, if the legal owner is itself divided, its majority."7 In putting
the onus on churches, however, sound neutral principles methods, like
Georgia's in Jones v. Wolf, 7 can and should provide flexibility by extend-
ing the scope of their neutral principles beyond documents of title to in-
clude applying the law of contracts to bylaws and denominational
constitutions;""' the "formal title" approach is simply unable to embody
the full range of polity expectations. 5
however, it seems reasonable to treat the dictum regarding individuals as applicable primarily
to donors who wish to place religious conditions on their gifts. See Casad, supra note 3,
at 61. See also Duesenberg, supra note 148, at 547; Comment, supra note 130, at 748.
1' See Sirico, supra note 15, at 75. However, there seems to be no reason to limit con-
structive notice to legal provisions in secular documents, as does Professor Sirico, id. at
68-79. It seems to be no great burden to impute to church members an understanding of
similar provisions in such fundamental documents as local church bylaws and denomina-
tional constitutions, see note 93 supra, so long as the provisions are expressed in secular
terms whose significance does not require the willingness of clergy or hierarchies to ex-
plain them. Cf Sampen, supra note 24, at 577 (ruling group within hierarchy may "arrogate
powers over church assets that have not been reserved to it by clouding its action with
the veil of doctrinal interpretation"); Sirico, supra note 15, at 58 ("To the ecclesiastical
eye [religious] language may clearly imply where property control lies.").
18 Sirico, supra note 15, at 75.
170 See notes 80-93 & accompanying text supra. Moreover, particular beliefs of churches
are rarely emphasized by disciplinary actions over erring members. 1 J. SCHAVER, supra
note 3, at 193-94, 203; cf. Whipple v. Fehsenfeld, 173 Kan. 427, 431-33, 249 P.2d 638, 642-43
(1952) (advocating discipline of members, including their explusion, departed from the "tradi-
tions, customs, doctrines, and usages" of the church).
1.1 See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 600, 602-03 (approving awarding of church property,
under neutral principles approach, on basis of legal title, where secularly oriented inquiry
into relevant documents reveals no interest in favor of general church or denomination).
Although neutral principles, by limiting inquiry to documents capable of a legal or secular
interpretation, may be described as "a restrictive rule of evidence," id. at 611 (Powell,
J., dissenting), such a restriction embodies the presumption that expectations regarding
church property are adequately expressed in such-documents. See note 132 & accompany-
ing text supra. For the justification for such a presumption, see note 172 infra.
1 See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 607 ("[A rebuttable] presumptive rule of majority represen-
tation ... would be consistent with both the neutral-principles analysis and the First Amend-
ment."), on remand, 244 Ga. 388, 260 S.E.2d 84 (1979) (adopting same), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1080 (1980).
Presumptions in favor of the title holder and majority representation are strongly sup-
ported by the rise of common-core Protestantism as a legislative fact, which establishes
that most church members view their "church" to be the local church, and expect its polity
to be democratic, despite theological or legal classifications (the latter arising from the
implied consent theory of Watson) to the contrary. See notes 80-95 & accompanying text supra.
... 443 U.S. at 600-01, 603-04 (extending neutral principles inquiry to secular provisions
in denomination's constitution).
174 See id.; Bernard, supra note 164, at 557-59 (positing contractual basis for church affilia-
tion). Because neutral principles would employ generally applicable legal principles to decide
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EMBODYING POLITY EXPECTATIONS LEGALLY: THE TASK
OF THE DENOMINATIONS
With property, trust, and contract law at their disposal, churches under
a neutral principles method are afforded broad flexibility in embodying
their polity expectations in a legally enforceable manner. The concern 17
that changing from deference to neutral principles may precipitate
disputes by forcing churches to deal forthrightly with matters of prop-
erty control is misplaced.17 Such a concern assumes that courts interfere
with religious rights by acting in an otherwise justifiable manner which
strongly encourages candid dealing among members, local churches, and
hierarchies. Moreover, it assumes that deference should be retained
precisely because the "implied consent" to which deference alludes is ab-
sent in fact.
Most litigated church property disputes involve legal title in a local
church or its trustees, a faction opposed to its former denomination and
a faction loyal to the denomination which alleges either an implied or
an explicit beneficial use by the denomination arising from the general
polity or other religious precepts of the denomination's confessions or
constitution.' Because a denomination is larger than are its constituent
the rights of parties as expressed in relevant documents, the implied consent rationale
for deference becomes tenuous. After Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
426 U.S. 696 (1976), a denomination may act arbitrarily toward its constituent churches
and members, id. at 712-20, although perhaps not fraudulently or collusively, id. at 713
& n.7. Even if judicial review for ecclesiastical fraud and collusion is still permitted, but
see text accompanying notes 106-07 supra, forbearance from fraud and collusion by defini-
tion cannot constitute consideration for a contract, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
S 73 (1979), and it is unclear under the theory of implied consent what other consideration
a denomination may be required legally to give. Hence, implied consent is tantamount to
an agreement by one party, the local church, to be governed by the decisions of another,
the denomination, where the latter remains essentially free to act as it wishes. Cf. 1977
UTAH L. REV. 138, 146 ("[Ihe conditions of such unions [with hierarchical churches] are en-
forceable and meaningful only in so far as the hierarchical body chooses them to be." (foot-
note omitted)). The enforceability of such an agreement thus seems questionable when viewed
under the neutral principles approach because of the lack of any consideration furnished
by the denomination. It would appear to violate the establishment clause for civil courts
to treat denominations in a preferential manner by enforcing agreements which would or-
dinarily be void for lack of consideration. See generally Note, supra note 99, at 1110 (courts
may not act so as to become in effect the secular arm of the church).
"I See note 93 supra. The formal title approach looks only to documents of title. See Sirico,
supra note 15, at 58. It was a minority position even during the heyday of Watson-type
deference. See, e.g., Master v. Second Parish Church, 124 F.2d 622 (1st Cir. 1941); Evangelical
Lutheran Synod v. First English Lutheran Church, 47 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. Okla. 1942), rev'd
on other grounds, 135 F.2d 701 (10th Cir. 1943) (inadequate amount in controversy requisite
to federal diversity jurisdiction), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 757 (1943).
E.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 613 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting).
17 See Sirico, supra note 15, at 57-58; cf. 24 CHRISTIANITY TODAY 782-83 (1980) (exodus from
United Presbyterian Church precipitated by denominational actions other than attempted
property control); note 93 supra (United Presbyterian Church ratified constitutional amend-
ment regarding control of property within one year of its proposal).
"I E.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
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congregations, and thus likely to be more aware of schisms and ensuing
property disputes, and because a denomination is able to insist on affilia-
tion on its own terms or not at all,' it seems proper that the burden
of clarifying ambiguous provisions regarding property should fall primarily
on the denomination. That average church members' expectations are
congregational,1" and thus comport with the legal title, reinforces the pro-
priety of so allocating the primary burden. Neutral principles methodology
effectively does so.
If a denomination is episcopal in polity 8' and, contrary to usual
practice,182 has left title in local churches, it should probably require a
transfer of legal title to it, to one of its offices (such as a bishopric), or
to trustees in trust for the entire denomination." The choice among these
options will depend on such presently irrelevant concerns as liability in
tort or contract. The doctrines which commonly underlie episcopal polities
make such a transfer logical"' and thus easy to obtain.
A purely congregational8 . church need do little to effectuate its expec-
tations if title is already in the local church or its trustees. It might,
however, wish to clarify the disposition of property should a schism oc-
cur between the majority of its members and its officers. Its denomina-
tion likely is only minimally concerned with such local matters, so that
here the onus must fall on the local congregation to clarify property mat-
ters. Because small local churches may be unaware of the need to do so,
it is fortunate that circumstances probably will arise only rarely in which
a neutral principles approach will yield a result contrary to prior expec-
tations, such as awarding control to officers who disagree with the con-
gregation's majority.
Most difficult to embody legally are connectional and hybrid polities.'
If the expectation is that the denomination controls such local matters
as it sees fit unless the local congregation withdraws and ceases claiming
any benefits of affiliation, then embodiment of expectations is relatively
easy and analogous to the actions needed by purely congregational
churches. If the expectation is that the polity be fully hierarchical, then
embodiment of expectations would proceed as with episcopal polities."
179 See Comment, Judicial Resolution of Church Property Disputes, 31 ALA. L. REV. 307,
331 (1980).
See notes 88-92 & accompanying text supra.
'8' For definitions of "episcopal" and "polity," see notes 3 & 156 supra.
18 See A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 529-46 (1964)
(discussing forms of church property ownership).
1 See id.
18 See, e.g., 1 J. MELTON, supra note 3, at 49-55; RELIGIOUS ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY
46 (E. Gaustad ed. 1968); 1 J. SCHAVER, supra note 3, at 22-23.
18 For a definition of "congregational," see notes 3 & 155 supra.
' See Sirico, supra note 15, at 12 n.52.
1 Cf. note 93 supra (United Presbyterian property now in trust by virtue of change
in denomination's constitution).
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Connectional and hybrid polities, however, usually require something dif-
ferent than congregationalism or episcopalism.
If forced to consider and articulate expectations before a dispute,
members might conclude that denominational affiliation arises from the
unity of Christian believers" and their mutual interdependence for ef-
fectively accomplishing Christian work, " for admonishing errant
members, 1' and for avoiding the scandal of Christian disunity.' Although
none of these purposes survives apostasy or heresy, civil courts cannot
determine what constitutes apostasy or heresy'92 and therefore cannot
allow a congregation to leave with its property on such grounds.
Resolutions of this dilemma are suggested indirectly by commentary
on the related topic of enforcing conditions on gifts to religious
institutions.'93 In any case in which the action of the denomination is in
issue, the dispute, by prior agreement, may be decided by an arbitration
committee."M A yet more refined resolution has been suggested recently:95
providing by agreement for mediation to resolve disputes and providing
that, if mediation fails, binding arbitration shall follow.", This approach
comports from a church perspective with Biblical admonitions to seek
reconciliation'" and from the court's viewpoint allows, without direct
judicial entanglement, enforcement of implied or express prior religious-
ly based conditions for the continuation of denominational affiliation.
Moreover, it allows the parties to choose qualified mediators and ar-
bitrators when the dispute arises, without relying on the partisan
denominational councils. Refusal to arbitrate or to abide by the arbitrators'
decision might result in forfeiture of property under a liquidated damages
clause.'
It is unlikely that every eventuality can be foreseen and provided for,
or that arbitrators can resolve perfectly every issue according to prior
expectations, express or implied. However, neither can civil courts. The
E.g., 1 J. SCHAVER, supra note 3, at 57.
', But ef S. AHLSTROM, supra note 3, at 422-28 (describing rise of voluntary, interdenomina-
tional associations for cooperative Christian work); R. LEE, supra note 77, at 76 (semble).
191 See 1 J. SCHAVER, supra note 3, at 191-99.
", See generally Casad, supra note 66; Stringfellow, supra note 150.
182 See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602; Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 728-29.
8 Comment, supra note 130.
18 Id. at 751-53. The other options suggested in the comment are creation of a condi-
tional trust with appointment of a trustee with unlimited discretion, id. at 749-51, reten-
tion of unlimited discretion by the donor, id. at 751, and specification in secular terms
of mandatory or prohibited religious acts with backup provisions for arbitration if courts
will not decide even these objective matters, id. at 753-54.
"I See CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY, MEDIATION/ARBITRATION (1980); CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIE-
TY, THE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES BETWEEN CHRISTIANS (1979).
IN See sources cited note 195 supra.
i8 E.g., 1 Corinthians 6:1-8.
18 How present consent-based deference alone would justify property- forfeiture for a
breach of an arbitration agreement is problematic.
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deference method declines even to try, speaking instead in terms of ex-
pectations which today are palpably fictitious.1" Under neutral principles,
at least, arbitrators' or mediators' best approximations of prior intent
should be recognized by civil courts as at least equal, and perhaps even
preferable, to their own approximations through the comparatively wooden
language of property, trust, and contract law."'
CONCLUSION
Two methods for resolving church property disputes have been upheld
as constitutional. The first method, judicial deference to the decision of
church authorities, has been supported by assumptions about the expec-
tations either of property donors-the implied trust rationale-or of
church members-the implied consent rationale. The implied trust ra-
tionale probably was always a thinly veiled fiction, and was unwieldly
in any event. It has been effectively paralyzed by the imposition of
stringent restraints under the first amendment's religion clauses. The
implied consent rationale has become a legal fiction even if it was not
so at its inception; church members' expectations today simply are not
as the rationale insists and courts should note the change as a legislative
fact. Moreover, it, too, has been so limited as to deprive it of its ability
even to approximate justice. That which-remains of the implied consent
rationale entangles courts in religious matters and affords churches too
little flexibility in the enforceable ordering of their internal property
affairs.
The other method, application of neutral principles of law to ascertain
the locus of property control, began with a plausible fiction that legal
documents adequately reflect church members' legal expectations. It was,
however, a fiction which produced dispositions which were closer to
general expectations than were the dispositions of the deference method.
Moreover, its consistent application will encourage churches so to order
their affairs that the method will cease relying on a fiction and instead
will reflect legal expectations embodied in standard legal precepts.
Denominations need only revise their constitutions or direct transfers of
title to reflect the consensus which they claim already exists.
No method of resolving church property disputes will be perfect in every
case; no method of resolving any type of case is always perfect. The neutral
principles method, however, promises over time closely to approximate
See notes 80-95 & accompanying text supra.
See generally Sirico, supra note 15, at 58. If a state does not generally recognize bin-
ding arbitration, the Constitution may require that an exception be made for church pro-
perty disputes. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1972) (if general rule of law
burdens the free exercise of religion, then only state interests of the highest order may
justify withholding of a religious exemption).
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expectations of church members and to avoid the constitutional evils of
both civil court entanglement in religious affairs and the inflexibility of
the law in accommodating the need of churches to govern themselves
according to their doctrines and traditions. If the method can fulfill its
promise it will largely lay to rest a continuing embarrassment to both
churches and courts-the public airing of religious disputes before a con-
stitutionally handicapped judiciary.
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